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This paper explores the consequences of rising returns to human capital investment on the per-
sonal savings rate. Over the past two decades, the return to college education has increased relative
to high school education leading economists to argue the presence of “skill biased technological
progress”. The literature explaining household savings has also burgeoned considerably, motivated
by its declining rate in the US over the past couple of decades. Stylized facts suggest a negative
relationship between returns to education and savings rates across most of the past century and
also a negative relationship between education spending and savings rates across OECD countries.
In this paper, we present a model where a declining savings rate emerges as an outcome of an
exogenously driven increase in the return to education. The link between the two is attributed to
optimizing behavior of altruistic households. The results of our model are robust to the inclusion
of life cycle savings and unintentional bequests. Some of the interesting results of our model are
(i) a rise in the return to education raises education spending ratio by less than what it reduces
the aggregate savings rate (ii) for some parameter values it actually reduces both the education
spending rate and the aggregate savings rate and ﬁnally, (iii) it also raises the return to capital due
to physical capital-human capital complementarity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Our tools for measuring savings and investment are stone age deﬁnitions in the inforation age
-William Nordhaus (1995)
The personal savings rate of the US economy has been declining steadilly since the early eighties.
Figure (1) shows the decline in both the household savings rate (as a share of personal disposable
income) and the gross private savings rate (as a share of GDP). The former which hovered around
10% during the early eighties had fallen to less than 2.5% by the late nineties and was at 1.4% in
2003. As the graph shows, most of this decline took place in the nineties. Similarly the gross private
savings rates declined from levels greater than 20% to levels below 15% by the late nineties. Over the
past years, researchers have proposed a multitude of explanations for the decline with candidates such
as the changing demographic structure, increasing ratio of wealth to income (reinforced by a belief
of good times in the future), an increase in the discount rate, huge transfers of wealth to the aged
(who have a higher marginal propensity to consume) through public institutions, increased access
to credit allowing greater consumption smoothing, etc.1 Gale and Sabelhaus (1999) take Nordhaus’
quote above seriously and try to re-measure savings. After augmenting household savings with data
on real capital gains, they suggest that savings is at its highest in the past forty years. They note that
adding human capital, research and development, and other intangible capital would further raise the
savings rate.2 However as ﬁgure (1) suggests, the decline in real capital gains during the ﬁrst years of
the twenty ﬁrst century clearly has not led to a rise in personal savings.3
From the early eighties onwards, the economy has also experienced what observers believe to be a
rapid pace of technological change with the beneﬁts of this change accruing disproportionately to those
with higher levels of skills. This phenomenon of “skill-biased technological change” is considered to
be the cause of a monotonic rise in income inequality experienced over the past two decades.4 Though
1See Parker (1999) and Lusardi, Skinner and Venti (2001) for a thorough review of these arguments.
2Also see Lusardi et al (2001) for an exhaustive discussion of “wealth” and “mismeasurement” based explanations.
3The literature trying to explain the decline in savings is quite extensive. Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ and Sabelhaus (1996)
decompose changes in savings due to cohort speciﬁc consumption propensities, those due to intergenerational redis-
tribution of resources, changes in government spending patterns and changes in demographics. They argue that the
redistribution of resources from the youth to the elderly and the higher consumption propensities of the latter group can
explain the decline in savings. Parker (1999) undertakes a thorough examination of existing explanations of the savings
decline. He argues that neither wealth changes nor the changing age distribution can completely explain the savings
decline since they post date the consumption boom . He also rules out the importance of explanations based on income
by age distribution, ﬁnancial innovations and intergenerational ﬁscal transfers. Parker notes that ﬁnancial innovation
can explain a third of the decline and wealth changes another ﬁfth. This implies that these two explanations are enough
to account for more than half of the decrease. He speculates that since consumption is a forward looking variable, the
consumption boom maybe linked to households learning about high levels of output in the future. Other possibilities
include a shift in household preferences and ﬁnally he does not rule out that a combination of some of the arguments
presented so far might explain the decline but questions the ability of a monocausal argument.
4For important theoretical contributions see Acemoglu (1998), Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), Galor and
Tsiddon (1997). Increasing international trade is also often considered to be a cause of the increase in income inequality.
However there now seems to be a greater consensus that skill biased technological change is the culprit.traditionally average earnings for the more educated have been greater than that for the less educated,
in the eighties and nineties the diﬀerences soared. Murphy and Welch (1992) noted that the college
high school wage diﬀerential for all experience levels rose from 40% in 1963 to 48% in 1970 and then
fell to 38% in the late 1970s only to soar to 58% in 1989. The dispersion in the returns to education
is also reﬂected in the average returns which have undergone dramatic changes in the post-war era.
Mincer (1998) notes that returns grew in the sixties, fell in the seventies to reach a low level of 4%,
then rebounded in the eighties and reached heights of 12% or more in the ﬁrst half of the nineties.
Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) drew attention to the important role of the
“demand” for more educated and skilled workers in driving these patterns. Kreuger (1993) suggested
that the advent of the computer has had a role to play in these changes. Autor, Katz and Kreuger
(1998) reconﬁrm the above ﬁndings by showing that the wage premium continued to rise in the nineties
and that the most rapid skill upgrading has taken place in the more computer intensive sectors of the
economy.5
Using these two widely observed movements in the US economy, we present a novel explanation for
the decline in savings rates. We argue that rising returns to education may be an important, and as yet
overlooked explanation for the decline in savings. Standard economic theory suggests that investments
in education should rise in response to an increase in its rate of return- and this is the ﬁrst element
of our model. Indeed, Mincer (1998) shows that enrollment rates for the period 1967-1990 responded
positively to the wage premia and predicted that an upward trend in enrollment was forthcoming. The
second element of our model is the assumption that households are altruistic, and parents care about
the amount they spend on their children’s education and on the amount that they allocate as ﬁnancial
transfers. Finally, in order to maximize the eﬀectiveness of their transfers, parents allocate funds to
these two types of transfers until the returns are equalized- an assumption that is fairly standard
since its introduction to the literature by Becker and Tomes (1986). In the presence of rising returns
to education, parents ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to spend on their children’s education rather than leave
bequests. Following a permanent increase in the return to education, it is then possible to show that
the ratio of bequests to output declines while the share of educational expenditures rise.
After establishing the main result, we then consider some important extensions to the model. A
decline in the bequest ratio is not the same as a decline in the savings rate. Individuals save for a
number of reasons with bequests being only one of them. Other important constituents include life
cycle savings and precautionary savings. To check for the robustness of the model we then extend it
to include life cycle savings. It turns out that the conditions which generate a decline in bequests will
also generate a decline in life cycle savings and therefore a decline in the aggregate savings rate too.
One of the interesting results of the model is that for some parameter values it might be possible for
5For recent challenges to the skill biased technological hypothesis see Card and DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux (2004).
However this work is more concerned with “within group” inequality rather than “between group” inequality. The latter
continued to rise in the nineties (see Figure 2, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2004)). Also see Autor et al (2004) for an
assessment of the labor economicsl i t e r a t u r eo nt h i ss u b j e c t .
3the reallocation towards human capital investment to occur without actually raising the educational
investment ratio while at the same time causing the savings rate to decline. Further our numerical
illustrations suggest that even a 1% increase in the human capital investment share can cause a 2%
decline in the aggregate savings rate. Thus the model predicts that we do not need to look for a one
for one substitution between the two ratios to test the theory and perhaps not even have to look for
an increase in educational investment shares at all.
A concern of those working on the nature of bequests, has been the relative importance of in-
tentional bequests to unintentional ones. To allow for both types of transfers, we further introduce
uncertainty regarding the timing of death. The results continue to be robust. Allowing uncertain
longevity means that the theoretical framework lends itself also to analyzing the eﬀects of increasing
life expectancy in the context of this framework. Increasing life expectancy implies that individuals
will save more for retirement, will allocate less to their children and accidental bequests will also fall.
Towards the end of our paper, we devote some space to analysing the relative eﬀects of changes in life
expectancy and changes in returns to education on the aggregate savings rate. We ﬁnd that the latter
has a greater eﬀect on savings rates.
The theoretical framework in this paper relies on the assumption that intergenerational transfers
are an important source of capital accumulation in the economy. The contribution of such transfers
relative to life cycle savings as the primary source of wealth accumulation was ﬁrst brought to at-
tention by Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981). They suggested that almost eighty percent of the stock
of wealth accumulated by households in 1974 was attributable to intergenerational transfers. Within
intergenerational transfers, one may distinguish between bequests and other types of transfers such as
tuition support, loans and transfers of businesses to children. This question of inclusion is one of the
main points of disagreement between the proponents of the intergenerational transfers and proponents
of the life cycle savings story- best exempliﬁed in the debate between Kotlikoﬀ (1988) and Modigliani
(1988). Modigliani is opposed to parental support in college education as being deﬁn e da sa ni n t e r g e n -
erational transfer. He argues that this is a transfer of human wealth and should not be incorporated
into any measure of non-human wealth. Kotlikoﬀ responded by arguing that as long as the transfer is
one of funds, the point is immaterial. Clearly this distinction is germane to the modeling strategy here.
The model relies on a distinction between the two not only because the behavior of their respective
returns diﬀer but also because education expenditures, as noted by Modigliani, does not go towards
asset accumulation but pays for current consumption.6Finally, and here there is less disagreement
between the two, is the importance of intentional bequests versus unintentional bequests. They both
agree that a large part of intergenerational transfers might be unintentional- precautionary savings
and life cycle savings that were not consumed until death will become intergenerational transfers. We
extend the model to include life cycle savings and uncertain life expectancy and the basic intuition
still goes through. On the whole, elements of the debate are well captured in the framework adopted
6Though as mentioned above, it is more appropriately viewed as an investment
4in this paper. Kotlikoﬀ’s argument that both types of intergenerational transfers matter implies that
the entire optimization exercise carried out below is not over a variable of insigniﬁcant magnitude;
Modigliani’s recognition of the distinction between diﬀerent types of transfers lies at the center of this
paper and both of their observations on unintentional bequests is also taken care of.7
The basic insight of the model that parents might bequeath less when they perceive their children’s
income to be growing faster was noted also by Meade (1966). However he did not concern himself
with issues of human capital and changes in the nature of transfers. In terms of the existing literature,
the argument presented in this paper is clearly the closest in spirit to that of Bils and Klenow (2000).
Their ﬁnding that it is not schooling which causes growth but the other way round is similar to the
motivation here and provides us with some indirect support. Lambertini (2004) is also closely related
to our work. She explores the consequences of skill biased technological change on public savings
through its eﬀects on funding of public education. The issue is important since a lot of the investment
in human capital indeed takes place through the public sector - even in higher education. However,
at least in the US, as we shall see, private spending has become quantitatively more important over
the past two decades. Finally, a set of papers by Rangazas (2000, 2002) are the only ones that
we are aware of which are actually interested in the implications of physical resources devoted to
human capital investment and its role in economic growth.8 Rangazas’ exercises are similar to growth
accounting exercises. The modelling structure is quite diﬀerent (though at the core, he too assumes an
optimization between human capital investments and physical capital investments) and the questions
asked are diﬀerent as well. However there are strong complementarities in terms of the overall research
agenda.
In addition to suggesting a novel explanation for the savings decline, the model draws attention
to the possible trade-oﬀ between physical capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. The
macroeconomic consequences of whether intergenerational transfers are in the form of ﬁnancial or
human wealth was recognized by Blinder (1976). He observed that human capital transfers enter into
the consumption expenditure side of the national income account whereas ﬁnancial bequests enter
the savings side. The recent work in economic growth (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)) has
argued that the human capital stock in an economy is an important factor in explaining diﬀerences
in growth rates across nations. Our model suggests that the decline in the savings rate is nothing but
the failure on the part of the national accounts to reﬂect a change in the nature of accumulation by
the household: an endogenous substitution of human capital wealth for ﬁnancial wealth in a period
where technological improvements favor skills.
7Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002) argue for a reconciliation of life cycle savings and bequests by suggesting that
bequest motives exist but such savings decisions can be viewed as contingent contracts. Thus there is a bequest motive,
but if in some states of the world there are unfavorable health shocks during old age, there are no bequests and the
money is used for medical expenditures.
8Most papers such as that of Bils and Klenow (2000) are more concerned with time costs.
5Our suggested explanation is both novel and yet can be perceived as being “obvious” once stated.
To persuade the reader, in the next section we present some stylized relationships between educational
and savings variables. Section 3 of the paper develops the theoretical model and in section 4, we
expand it in logical steps to include life cycle savings and unintentional bequests. Section 5 of the
paper concludes.
2 Stylized Facts on Education and Savings
Given that there are so many competing explanations for the savings decline, how much more of a
story can human capital contribute? To consider the argument presented here, one needs to look at the
magnitude of changes in investment in human capital as a share of GDP. In practice, the true measure
of investment in human capital is anybody’s guess.9 The share of aggregate education expenditures,
in GDP has hardly changed over the past few decades and hovers at around seven percent. However
these are direct expenditures and since they do not include opportunity costs and activities which are
complementary to human capital formation, they are o f t e nr e g a r d e dw i t hs k e p t i c i s mb yr e s e a r c h e r s .
This throws up an obvious problem- the easiest source of data cannot be used to test the basic theory.
We are therefore left with a grab bag of stylized facts that we hope will convince the reader of a
possible negative association between educational investment and savings rates. Many of these, we
hope the reader will agree, are actually quite interesting and surprisingly seems to have gone unnoticed
in the literature.
Two well known pieces in the national income measurement literature have tried to recalculate
the investment and stock in human capital. Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1990) attempted to measure
investment in education. If one looks at education’s contribution only to market based activities, their
estimate of aggregate investment in education as a share of GDP turns out to be 45%. Mincer (1990)
in his comment on their paper noted that the rate of discount used by Jorgenson and Fraumeni was
half of what it should have really been. That reduces the percentage roughly to 22.5%- still a very
high number. Mincer himself prefers cost based approaches and notes that investment in education
would end up being 14% of GNP (However, in his 1998 paper, Mincer quotes a lower share of 9.1%
of GNP for 1980 of which 5% is in post secondary education). Adding on the job training takes this
number up by another 6% to 20%. Though not related to the model presented here, one can conjecture
that investment in on the job training is likely to rise during periods of rapid technological change.
More indirect evidence of the importance of human capital stock comes from Kendrick’s (1976) classic
study which suggested that more than half of US capital stock is comprised of human capital. Given
that physical capital investment in the US hovers at around 15% as a share of GDP, one would not
be amiss in assuming that the oﬃcial 7% share in national accounts data for education spending is a
serious underestimate and the correct estima t e sm a y b em o r ei nl i n ew i t ht h a to fM i n c e r ’ s .
9The well known paper on conditional convergence, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) faced exactly the same problem
and had to rely on extrapolations of enrollment rates as proxies for human capital investment rates.
6Since investment in education numbers are hard to come by, one can instead look at the relationship
between the returns to higher education and the savings rates. We already know that the relationship
is negative during the late twentieth century. In ﬁgure (2), we plot the movements of returns to higher
education, the personal savings rate and the private savings rate through the most of the previous
century for the United States. The savings rates are ﬁve year moving averages based on annual data
from the national accounts while the return to education are decade estimates for returns to college
for young men from Goldin and Katz (1999). The graph suggests that a strong negative relationship
might have persisted between the two up to 1950 as well and again in the seventies. Only during the
ﬁfties and the sixties does the negative relationship seem not to hold.10
To make an indirect assessment of the changes in investment in education, it is useful also to
look at what happened to enrollments in higher education.11 Figure (3) depicts enrollments in all
higher education institutions for the 18-24 age group for the period 1960-2001. The overall trend is a
monotonic increase in enrollment rates. During the seventies there is a stagnation which has already
been the subject of the labor economics literature (see Card and Lemieux (2001)) and this coincided
with a slight increase in savings rates and the fall in returns to higher education. From the early
eighties the enrollment rates continued to rise and this coincided with falling savings rates and rising
returns. As in the earlier graph we do still have a problem with the sixties. We use this ﬁgure to
show another important aspect of human capital investments: the problems with national accounts
data not withstanding, we have plotted the relative importance of private to public spending in higher
education from 1960. Note that in the late sixties that share of private spending was considerably
high and then through the late sixties and most of the seventies this ratio declined. Again this is
a period when household savings rates went up and one could argue that perhaps the fact that the
government’s rising participation in higher education funding may have allowed household savings
rates to rise. From the eighties onwards we again see the rising share of private spending and this
coincides with a decline in the personal savings rate.
To derive an alternative estimate of the possible magnitude of the role of expenditures in education
in explaining the savings decline, we looked at the weights given to education expenditures in the
consumer price index over the years. These weights include only tuition, books and fees and no
other expenditures and stand at a paltry 2.62% in 1998 (this translates to a 2.5% share in terms
of personal disposable income). In 1980 this number was even lower at 0.87% (which translates to
0.76% of personal disposable income). Between 1980 and 1998 the savings rate as a share of personal
disposable income fell by 6.5%. Based on these numbers increases in educational expenditures as a
share of personal disposable income, can explain 28.2% of the savings decline. If we close in further to
10One can argue that for the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century what should matter more are returns to schooling
rather than college. In fact, the return to schooling also dropped drastically (from approximately 12% to 5%) between
1914 to 1950 (see ﬁgure 4, Goldin and Katz(1999)).
11We look at investment in higher education since that is where the larger increases are likely to take place given the
relatively low higher education enrollment rates in the US.
7the period 1984-98, which is at the heart of the savings decline, personal savings as a share of personal
disposable income declined by 4.5 percentage points from 8.2% to 3.65%, while the share of education
rose by 0.9% points. This also suggests a prima facie case for explaining almost 23% of the decline in
the savings rate.12
Another set of evidence on the negative relationship between educational expenditures and savings
rates comes from international comparisons. In ﬁgure (4) we plot the household savings rates for OECD
countries and private education expenditure as a share of GDP for the year 2000. One can clearly
see a strong negative relationship with the sole exception of one point on the far right (Korea). For
the 14 OECD countries for which we have data, the correlation between these two variables is -0.30.
Once one excludes Korea the correlation jumps to -0.63. This is indeed a strong negative association
and we are not aware of any other study that has noticed this. Another outlier is of course the US
which has the highest private spending on education as a share of GDP in the group and also one of
the lowest savings rates. Once we drop the US in addition to Korea, the negative correlation drops to
-0.48 - still very high.13
Clearly these exercises suggest that rising returns to education is at least worth investigating as a
potential candidate in explaining the decline in the savings rate. We should also note, that while we
have been searching for a negative relationship between educational expenditures and savings rates as
motivating evidence for the theory, the theory itself will suggest that rising returns to human capital
can actually reduce the aggregate savings rate without necesarilly raising the educational expenditure
shares.
The next section of the paper develops a simple model with bequests being the sole constituent
of savings. Section 4 of the paper incorporates life cycle savings. The ﬁrst subsection deals with no
uncertainty regarding life spans. The second subsection further develops the model by introducing
uncertainty and therefore allowing unintentional bequests as well.
12One could easily argue that direct measures such as these do not capture the entire picture and can even be
underestimates. Measures of investment in human capital do not generally include activities complementary to formal
education. This is particularly true in the case of pre-college education. As the returns to college education rise, and
securing admission becomes more competitive, parents to spend a lot more on their children’s school education. This
includes but is not restricted to costs incurred in tutoring and extra-curricular activities (which is often argued to
increase the “cognitive skills” of the child) in order to enhance their children’s prospects. In addition to underestimating
investment in education in the accounting sense, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting increasing “time costs” have been
ignored as well. See “The Parent Trap”, Cover story in Newsweek (Jan 29, 2001). Adding on the job training would
presumably increase the importance of education spending specially in a period during which rapid technological change
forces ﬁrms to retrain their workers.
13The countries for which data are available include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, UK and USA. The data for the private spending on education comes from OECD
(2003) and the data on household savings rates comes from OECD (2004).
83T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider an overlapping generations economy with perfectly competitive markets. Economic activity
extends over inﬁnite discrete time. In every period the economy produces a single homogenous good
that can be used for consumption, investment in physical capital and investment in human capital.
The good is produced by physical capital and human capital augmented raw labor. The supply of the
two factors of production, physical and human capital, is determined endogenously.
3.1 Production in the Economy
In every period the ﬁnal good is produced under a constant returns to scale neoclassical production
function that is subject to technological progress. The output produced at time t is,
Yt = Y (Kt,A tHt) ≡ AtHtf(kt); kt ≡ Kt/(AtHt)
where At represents a human capital-augmenting productivity parameter. Kt and Ht represent phys-
ical and human capital stocks respectively in any given period, t. The production function f(kt)
is strictly monotonic increasing, strictly concave satisfying the neoclassical boundary condition that
ensure the existence of an interior solution to the producer’s proﬁt maximizing problem.
Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage rate per eﬃciency unit
of labor and the rate of return to capital at time t, wt and rt respectively, producers employ the
optimal amount of capital Kt and human capital Ht, in order to maximize proﬁts, i.e. {Kt,H t} =
argmax[AtHtf(kt) − wtHt − rtKt]. Competitive factor markets ensure that factor prices equal their
marginal products,
rt = f0(kt)
wt = At[f(kt) − f0(kt)kt] ≡ Atw(kt)( 1 )
Ht, the human capital stock is the economy’s stock of raw Labor augmented by an eﬃciency
parameter h,
Ht = htL
where L represents the population in the economy and is ﬁxed and h represents the human capital
augmenting factor. Without loss of generality, we assume that L is normalized to 1. The production
function for human capital, is simple. Human capital for a single individual, in any period, ht is a
simple concave function of the educational expenditures in the past period, et−1
14,
14In practice, human capital production functions can be quite complicated and its correct speciﬁcation is the subject
of a wide literature. More comprehensive speciﬁcations would include time investments, human capital of teachers,
and diﬀerent speciﬁcations for diﬀerent levels of education based on microeconomic evidence. For example see Bils and
Klenow (2000) and Rangazas (2002). Also, here we assume that expenditures increase the quantity of human capital
and not necesarilly the quality.
9ht = eθ
t−1,θ ∈ (0,1) (2)
From equation(1) it follows that an individual receives a ﬁnal wage of wtAtht.
Capital is assumed to depreciate completely in every period. This assumption ensures that there
is a clear correspondence between inherited wealth in this model and household savings as deﬁned in
national accounts.15 Technological progress is exogenous and takes place at a constant rate of growth,
g,
At+1 =( 1+g)At
In this setup there are two ways to capture the eﬀect of rising returns to education- through changes
in parameter values of g and θ. Accelerating technological change (increases in g) could potentially
raise the return to investing in human capital since higher A leads to higher wages. Alternatively
rising θ reduces the extent of diminishing returns and thus encourage education spending. Galor and
Moav (2000) use increasing g to characterize skill-biased technological change while Lambertini (2004)
uses rising θ to characterize skill biased technological change.16 In this paper we choose to focus on
the latter. One problem with focussing purely on changes in g is we know for a fact that during the
eighties there was a TFP slowdown and this would mean a slowdown in g - which would reduce the
return to human capital and thus be counterfactual. Also in a closed economy changes in g will not
aﬀect the relative returns of physical and human capital anyways. Therefore, we choose to conduct
our entire analysis with respect to changes in θ. However note that this is also simply an analytical
device, a more full-blown model would incorporate the rising demand for college educated labor. This
would surely add more realism but would needlessly complicate the basic story.
3.2 The household
In each period a generation is born. The economy is characterized by the coexistence of two generations
simultaneously. Individuals are assumed to care about the total transfer they make to their children.17
15In fact in a closed economy version, the two will be exactly the same. The only diﬀerence arising from the small
open economy assumption is that some of the inherited wealth may be invested abroad.
16It must be noted, however, that in Galor and Moav (2000), rising g has diﬀerential eﬀects on the skilled versus the
unskilled.
17Most overlapping generations models usually incorporate only one type of transfer -either human capital or bequests.
Usually this depends on the focus of the model. Very few include both. Becker and Tomes (1986) takes cognizance of
both types of transfers and it is their style which is adopted here. A similar preference structure in a dynamic setting is
employed by Galor and Moav (2005) but abstracts from technological progress. Zilcha (2003) incorporated both bequests
and human capital investments into the parents’ utility function to study economic growth. However the functional form
is of a constant returns Cobb-Douglas nature where human capital and bequests enter as separate arguments. In such
a setup an individual’s preferences structure might imply a relatively higher share of wealth being allocated to bequests
relative to education spending or vice versa. One can then compare growth trajectories that emerge under the two
diﬀerent cases. Such a preference structure is obviously too restrictive to answer the question posed here. A lot of the
work in overlapping generational models of human capital formation also usually assumes that individuals make their
own educational investments. In practice however this is not completely correct. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) show
that intergenerational transfers begin with huge amounts earmarked by parents to support their children’s human capital
accumulation.
10At any period t, members of one generation (generation, t + 1), are economically inactive and spend
time receiving an education. Members of another generation (generation, t), work and earn their
livelihood. With their income and the bequest they receive, members of generation t in time period t
consume the ﬁnal good, support the younger generation’s education and make bequest allocations. All
transactions take place at the beginning of each period and shocks to the growth rate of technological
progress also take place then. Therefore an individual is aware if her income changed because of a
shock and adjusts expenditures accordingly.
Since an individual is not economically independent in the ﬁrst period of her life, utility is deﬁned
over expenditures in the second period. In addition to her own consumption, she derives utility from
the sum of the value of total transfers it makes to its oﬀsprings. Transfers can take place in the form
of investments in human capital and bequests. Altruism is directed only towards the young and not
towards the old. In any period t, the only source of savings therefore are bequests of agents of period
t.
The utility function is assumed to be of the logarithmic form and is separable in consumption and





t + γ lnωt (3)
subject to,
ct
t + ωt = wtAtht + rtbt−1 (4)
where
ωt = et + bt (5)
and
α<1,γ<1a n dα + γ =1
ωt is the total transfer made by a member of generation t. The budget constraint says that the sum
of all expenditures is equal to the sum of an individuals labor earnings, wtAtht and her inheritances,
rtbt−1.As u p e r s c r i p tt implies that the value of the variable in question was chosen by a member of
generation t. A subscript tell us in which period that variable belongs to. The superscript is avoided
for variables for which there is no such confusion.
Utility maximization implies that the following solutions for ct
t and ωt will hold,
ct
t = α(wtAtht + rtbt−1)( 6 )
bt + et = γ (wtAtht + rtbt−1)( 7 )
Given the current speciﬁcation, the model by itself does not provide a method for calculating how
the total transfers should be divided between bequests and human capital investment. The decision
regarding this is assumed to come from an arbitrage equilibrium. That is, the net rate of return on
11education and ﬁnancial assets are equalized (Becker and Tomes (1986)). This implies that, investment
in education will be undertaken until a point such that,
re,t = rt
where re,t denotes the marginal rate of return on human capital investments. Given the human capital
production function, the condition can be rewritten as,
wt+1At+1h0(et) ≡ re,t+1 = rt+1 (8)











rt+1 is increasing in kt+1,this of course means that the optimal amount of e∗
t is increasing in
kt+1 as well. One can make some easy observations based on the above expression- from an individual’s
point of view (i.e the partial equilibrium) an increase in θ unambiguously raises the optimal level of
investment. Further higher At+1 also raises the optimal amount of investment.18 To get a complete
grasp of the general equilibrium eﬀects, for the rest of the paper we will assume that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas. This not only aids in obtaining closed form solutions but also makes it



































Substituting equation (10) in equation (9) and after some rearranging we have both the optimal






18Note that in a small open economy, since wages and interest rates are ﬁxed, the above expression would provide the

























i.e the capital per eﬃciency unit of labor is completely described by past bequests and the level of
technology.
For the rest of the paper what we will care about are the ratios of education and savings to GDP
per capita and to personal disposable income per capita (in the closed economy both of these are the





















Substituting equations (11), (12) and (13) into the above expression and solving further gives us
a clean expression for the bequest ratio:
Bt =
γλ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(16)
Substituting this into equation (14), gives us the equilibrium education spending ratio in the
economy:
Et =
γ (1 − λ)θ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(17)
Therefore both bequests and education levels increase at the same rate as GDP and their shares
remain constant unless preferences or production parameters change. Of particular interest to us is
the eﬀect of θ : an increase in theta produces the desired eﬀect- it raises the education spending ratio
and reduces the bequest ratio. As we had hinted earlier, the level of technology has no “ratio” eﬀect
since it’s growth aﬀects both GDP and these two variables identically. Thus declining TFP growth
in this model is perfectly compatible with rising returns to education and a declining savings rate.
Finally, we derive the expression of two additional variables: the growth rate of output per capita
(ytAtht) and the interest rate. Note, that growth rate of output per capita is the same as the growth














1−θ (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
γ
(18)
The derivation is done in the appendix. Note that an increase in θ unambiguously raises the interest
rate. Therefore an increase in the return to education also raises the return to physical capital. This
is not surprising, as it becomes more proﬁtable to invest in education, individuals move away from
investing in physical capital which raises the marginal product of the latter and moreover since the
two factors are complementary inputs in production a higher level of human capital raises the return
on physical capital. Finally, note that the growth rate of technology raises both the growth rate of
output per capita and the interest rate. Of course, this result is simlar to standard Solow model
except that we now have 1
1−θ-which reﬂects the endogenous response of human capital accumulation
to changes in g. A tempting application of this result is the stock market returns during the eighties
and particularly the nineties. We know for a fact that real returns to capital rose rapidly during this
period. The above equation suggests that higher returns to education could have caused this increase.
As discussed earlier, the literature on skill biased technological change uses the advent of information
and communcation technologies as the manifestation of such technological change. There is also a
literature that argues that stock market returns were tied to the information technology revolution
(e.g. see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001)). Based on all of this one
can construct a couple of diﬀerent scenarios- since the returns to capital were really high only in the
nineties and not so much in the eighties, it is possible that in the eighties an increase in θ took place
simultaneously with a decrease in g and thus interest rates were not aﬀected. In the nineties however
the higher θ coincided with a resurgence in g w h i c hl e dt oam u c hh i g h e rr e t u r ni np h y s i c a lc a p i t a l .I n
either case, what happens to g does not aﬀect the savings rate and the education expenditure ratio.
4 Introducing Old Age Consumption into the Closed Economy
As discussed in the earlier, the empirical literature on wealth accumulation is divided between pro-
ponents of the importance of life cycle savings and intergenerational transfers.19 In this section we
extend the model to include life cycle savings as well. The ﬁrst subsection presents the model without
any uncertainty involved. Therefore there are no unintentional bequests. The second subsection intro-
duces uncertainty and allows such types of bequests to occur. This complicates the analysis somewhat
but the story still goes through.
19It must be added that there is also considerable support for the precautionary savings hypothesis which we have not
discussed in this paper.
144.1 No Uncertainty
The economy is now characterized by the coexistence of three generations simultaneously. At any
period t, members of generation t+1, are economically inactive and spend time receiving an education
as before. Members of generation t are working and earning their livelihood. With their income and
also the bequest they receive they consume the ﬁnal good, support the younger generation’s education,
make bequest allocations for the younger generation and save a fraction of their income for retirement.
The third generation live oﬀ their own savings.20
An individual’s utility is now deﬁned over second and third period consumption and from expen-
ditures on their children. As before, the utility function is assumed to be of the logarithmic form and






t + β lnct
t+1 + γ lnωt (19)
subject to,
ct




α + β + γ = 1 (22)
Utility maximization implies that the following solution for ct
t,c t
t+1 and ωt will hold,
ct
t = α(wtAtht + rtbt−1) (23)
ct
t+1 = βrt+1 (wtAtht + rtbt−1) (24)
bt + et = γ (wtAtht + rtbt−1) (25)
In the previous subsection where we did not have any life cycle savings, both personal disposable
income and ﬁnal output were identical. However now one needs to be more careful: there are two gen-
erations that receive income- the working age generation whose disposable income is (wtAtht + rtbt−1)
and the elderly whose disposable income is rtst−1. The sum of these two disposable incomes is equal
20Note that bequests here are not so in the strict sense of the term. Individuals receive them before the death of their
parents and hence are literally inter-vivos intergenerational transfers which earn a return. It is easy to see that even if
it were a bequest at death, the maximization problem and budget constraints would be unchanged. This is because the
bequest allocation will earn a return for over two periods. That would be compensated by the fact that it needs to be
discounted one period to make it comparable to the returns to investment in education -leaving the situation unaltered.
The only way it would matter is that it would impose some additional liquidity constraints. Since the model will
not incorporate issues of liquidity constraints on education expenditures, this assumption only plays a simplifying role.
Further allowing perfect capital markets would remove this restriction as well. The evidence on borrowing constraints is
ambiguous. Shea (1998), Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cameron and Taber (2004) ﬁnd no evidence that borrowing
constraints play a role in college choices.
15to ﬁnal output. The working generation saves st +bt whereas the retired generation simply consumes














wtAtht + rtbt−1 + rtst−1
(27)
To derive the aggregate savings rate we will derive the two fractions separately. This simpliﬁes
the problem considerably. The ﬁrst fraction can be solved by using the results from the household
optimization problem. Before we can proceed though, we need to recalculate the optimal amount of
e∗


















=( γ + β) −
et
(wtAtht + rtbt−1)
Substituting the value of the optimal amount of education (28) into the above expression and





(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
Like before, an increase in θ reduces the savings rate. Adding life cycle savings does not alter this
basic result. This is not surprising given the logarithmic nature of the utility function which ensures
that st
(wtAtht+rtbt−1) = β irrespective of what happens to the return to education.




γλ− β (1 − λ)θ
λ +( 1− λ)θ
(29)





β (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ + β)λ
(30)
which is clearly an increasing function of θ. To derive the second component of Xt in equation
(27), note that
16rtst−1





t Atht + αkα−1
t (bt−1 + st−1)
Using the fact that kt =
bt−1+st−1
Atht and equation (30) allows us to simplify the above expression to
rtst−1
(wtAtht + rtbt−1 + rtst−1)
=





wtAtht + rtbt−1 + rtst−1
=1−
rtst−1
(wtAtht + rtbt−1 + rtst−1)
⇒
wtAtht + rtbt−1
wtAtht + rtbt−1 + rtst−1
=1−
β (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
γ + β
(32)
T h i sg i v e su st h eﬁnal expression for the aggregate savings rate:
Xt =
λ(γ + β)
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
µ
1 −




⇒ Xt = λ
µ
γ +( 1− λ)β (1 − θ)
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
¶
(34)
If β = 0, this reverts back to the bequest only case discussed above. Note that adding life cycle
savings has two eﬀects on the aggregate savings rate. First of all, by deﬁnition, it increases the
aggregate savings rate of the working adults. On the other hand since the elderly do not save, this
reduces the aggregate savings rate. The conﬂicting eﬀects are best understood through equation (33).
The ﬁrst term tells us the savings rate of the working adults. This is multipled by a term that weighs
their income in the total disposable income of the economy. Note that from the second term an increase
in θ reduces the weight placed on the disposable income of the working adults. This is because for
the retired a rise in the return to education also raises the return to capital which acts as a bonus for
them. Thus rising returns to education now has a second eﬀect that reduces the aggregate savings
rate. We can also ﬁgure out the share of bequests in aggregate disposable income in this economy
using equations (29) and (32):
Bt =
γλ− β (1 − λ)θ
λ +( 1− λ)θ
µ




Again an increase in θ lowers the bequest ratio in the economy. Note that now it is possible for the
bequest ratio to be negative - life cycle savings assures that physical capital accumulation will never be
zero. Bequests will be negative if θ is high enough. The question of whether one should consider this
possibility seriously or not is open to debate. Negative bequests means that parents borrow to ﬁnance
their children’s education and the loan is repaid by the child. This is not completely unrealistic-
presumably with most college loans parents provide some kind of backing and guarantee even if it is
17the child that is the borrower, and presumably the entire family is involved in the decision.21 Also
note that the loans are repaid while the parents are still alive.
Finally, we derive the education ratio, interest rate and the growth rate of the economy - the
details of which are worked out in the appendix. Education spending as a share of GDP is now:
Et =( ( 1− λ)θ)
µ
γ +( 1− λ)β (1 − θ)
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
¶
(36)
An increase in θ no longer necesarilly implies increases in the education spending ratio. In fact
it is possible for the education spending ratio to go down while life cycle savings goes down too in
response to an increase in θ. From the expression above, clearly what happens depends on whether,





. To investigate this further note
that we can write the equation for Et as:
⇒ Et =
µ
(1 − λ)θ(γ + β)
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
− (1 − λ)θβ
¶
Comparing this to equation (17), the ﬁrst term here in parentheses reﬂects the fact that young
working adults will raise the education spending relative to their disposable income. However we
have the additional −(1 − λ)θβ term which creates the ambiguity. This reﬂects the fact that the
retired generation beneﬁt from a higher return on the life cycle savings, which raises their share in
personal disposable income and since they do not spend on education, it works to reduce the total
education spending as a share of total disposable income. Whether education spending as a share of
GDP increases or not depends upon whether
λ(γ+β)
(λ+(1−λ)θ)2 R β.22 T h el e f th a n ds i d ei st h em a r g i n a l
eﬀect of higher theta on education spending rate by the economically active and the right hand side
reﬂects the relative importance of life cycle savings which increases the share of the elderly in total
income (see equation (28)). For low values of γ a n dh i g hv a l u e so fθ, the educational spending ratio
may actually go down rather than go up. Low values of γ will tend to raise the interest rate and thus
increase the share of the elderly’s disposable income and high values of theta by reducing bequest
transfers (and hence physical capital accumulation) will also raise the interest rate.




1−θ (λ +( 1− λ)θ)










1−θ − 1 (38)
21Who do they borrow from? In the general equilibrium, parents “lend” some of their life cycle savings for education
spending. Again this is all subject to the caveat that we have not considered the issue of collateralizing human capital
investment loans.
22This can be easilly ﬁgured out by checking the condition for
∂Et
∂θ > 0.
18Though the model is much too sparse for a proper replication of the US economy, we pursue some
numerical illustrations. We will examine the aggregate savings rate, the education spending rate, the
b e q u e s tr a t ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t e . T h em a i nq u e s t ion is of course choosing appropriate parameter
values. For the illustration we assume that λ =1 /3 which is standard in the literature. For α we
assume 0.60, β =0 .25 and for γ =0 .15. There are a couple of reasons why we assume such a high
value for α a n ds u c hal o wv a l u ef o rβ. First of all the model assumes equal lengths of time spent
working and retiring. This is not true in reality. Even after college, an average adult can expect to
work for more than 40 years and retire at the age of 65 for about 20 years. Thus an easy way out is to
assign an alpha twice the value of beta. To this we can add two more things- the fact that the future
is discounted and the fact that during the working period, an adult also needs to feed his oﬀspring.
With all this in mind α =0 .6 seems to be a reasonable assumption. Also note that a value of β thats
too high would imply a savings rate too that would be improbably high. Finally for γ we assume a
relatively low weight to show that some of the numerical examples work even with limited altruism.
The real problem is choosing a correct value for θ. Rangazas (2000) allows this to range from 0.10 to
0.15 based on observed shares. However his human capital production function is more speciﬁci nt h a t
it allows also for past human capital and existing stock of knowledge to matter and exhibits constant
returns to scale in all three. Since our production function assumes decreasing returns to scale we will
probably need slightly higher assumed values. One way to get around this is to use values of theta
that are consistent with average real interest rates. For example, given that historically the long term
real return on stocks in the US has been 6.5%, one can use the theta that corresponds between an
average of this number and a long run risk free return. Therefore it might be reasonable to focus
the sensitivity of the savings rate and other variables to changes in theta when the real interest rate
lies between 4.5 to 6.5%. To calculate interest rates for various theta, we also need prior estimates
o ft h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fAt. Based on historical data, we assume an annual g value of 2.0% and also
p l o tr a t e sf o ral o w e rv a l u eo fg = 1% (corresponding to lower TFP growth during the eighties). The
latter number corresponds to the period of TFP slowdown. Finally, while the numbers discussed here
are are annual rates, our model is an OLG model with longer time periods. When working with the
calculations, we assume that each period lasts 25 years. Figure (5) plots the the Bequest ratio (Bt),
the education spending ratio (Et), the aggregate savings rate (Xt) and the interest rate (rt).
<Insert Figure (5) here>
The ﬁrst graph on the top left shows the bequest ratio as a share of GDP (which is the same as
aggregate personal disposable income). As the graph suggests, the ratio falls oﬀ quite rapidly and
reaches zero by the time θ =0 .3. At that point, the aggregate savings rate is approximately 16% and
the education spending ratio is 10% and the real interest rate corresponding to g = 2% (high g) is at
6%. These are all reasonable values though the aggregate savings rate does correspond more to the
private savings rate rather than the personal savings rate. Notice that the education ratio begins to
19decline for high values of theta. At these values the bequest ratio is substantially negative (-0.04%)
and the interest rate is substantially higher at almost 9% (corresponding to θ =0 .6) and the savings
rate is at 10%.
The obvious question to ask here is what is the reduction in the aggregate savings rate (and the
change in the education spending ratio) when θ increases. Let’s consider three examples. As a ﬁrst
scenario, consider the case when θ =0 .05 and rises to 0.1. At such low levels of θ, the marginal return
to human capital investment is very high and this is reﬂected in the fact the education spending to
GDP ratio rises by about 2% points from less than 3% of GDP to 5% of GDP. The aggregate savings
rate on the other hand drops from 27.5% to 25%- a slightly larger drop. Thus even at such low levels
of θ the decrease in the savings rate is larger than the increase in education spending rate, albeit
marginally. However the interest rate here is on the lower side- it increases from 4% to 4.5%.
The second scenario we consider is an increase of θ from 0.25 to 0.30. Here we begin with an
aggregate savings rate of approximately 18.3% and education spending ratio of 9.2%. Following the
increase in θ, we ﬁnd that the savings rate has fallen to 16.7% and the education spending ratio has
risen to only 10%- therefore a 1% increase in education rate leads to a 2% decline in the savings rate.
The interest rate also increases by half a percentage point from 5.5% to 6%. If we allow g to fall to 1%
simultaneously we can see that the interest rate would not rise but decline by half a percentage point
to 5%. Of course in the nineties the growth rate of the economy went up. But in our model note that
the growth rate is a positive function of both g and θ (see equation (38)). Therefore an increase in
g is not necessary to raise the overall growth rate since we have assumed that theta has risen in any
case.
Finally as a third exercise one can consider what happens when bequests are already in the neg-
ative range. Of course this exercise is subject to the caveat that we have not really bothered about
collateralization of human capital and hence must be considered completely speculative. Suppose
theta increased from 0.4 to 0.45. In this case initially the savings rate is 13.9% and the education
spending ratio is 11.1%. Following an increase in theta, the savings rate drops to 12.7% and the
education spending ratio rises only to 11.4%. This is an enormous eﬀect- for every percentage point
increase in education spending the savings rate declines by 4 points. Clearly what happens here is
that the retired begin to beneﬁt a lot from the sudden increase in theta which raises the return to
capital. Also the fact that bequests are negative, puts further pressure on interest rates and hence the
reallocation eﬀect towards education spending is dwarfed by the factor price eﬀects. At this level of
theta, the interest rate is fairly high at 7% and increases to 7.5%.
Overall, one can conclude that the increase in education spending is usually lower than the decline
in the aggregate savings rate following an increase in θ. As θ increases the tradeoﬀ becomes higher- it
is possible to see reductions in the savings rate with smaller and smaller increases in human capital
investment rate.
204.2 Adding Uncertainty
To capture the role of educational returns in explaining the decline of savings rate, we have chosen
a utility maximizing framework that assumes individuals optimize between ﬁnancial bequests and
human capital investments. The advantage of this is obvious in that it makes the arbitrage condition
between the two investments the centerpiece of the model. A skeptic might be led to wonder if ﬁnancial
bequests are indeed important enough that increases in human capital investments are largely due
to reductions in such bequests. Since Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981) published their ﬁndings that
bequests were the major source of capital accumulation in the US, the debate has largely been one
of whether bequests are intentional or unintentional. On the whole the literature seems to suggest
that unintentional bequests are more important that intentional ones. Clearly, if the theory presented
here is to have any empirical signiﬁcance, then it should be robust to the inclusion of unintentional
bequests. Incorporating both unintentional bequests and intentional bequests in a uniﬁed model can
be problematic, more so when one has human capital accumulation, endogenous interest rates and
technological progress.23 One has to now allow for heterogeneity of agents since wealth accumulation
along a dynasty depends on its mortality history. Abel (1985) was probably the ﬁrst to introduce
unintentional bequests explicitly and derived the intra-cohort distribution of bequests, wealth and
consumption. He then went on to analyze the eﬀect of actuarially fair social security on national
wealth. However intentional bequests were not included and neither were human capital investments.
Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2003) developed the Abel model further to incorporate public education and
re-examine ﬁscal policy issues. They also allow the interest rate to be endogenous. Both of these
papers use overlapping generations frameworks and assume that individuals can live for two periods
but a certain fraction of them die at the end of the ﬁrst period. This creates unintentional bequests.
It also means that even though agents maybe similar at the initial time period eventually there will
be a distribution of wealth. The modeling strategy adopted here is similar in this respect but is quite
diﬀerent from then on. This is necessitated by the diﬀerent preference structure assumed so far in
our model: the optimal allocation between intentional bequests and human capital. Compared to
those papers we are less interested in the actual distribution of wealth at every time period and more
interested in the savings ratio in the aggregate. This does not mean that distributional issues can be
ignored - after all the aggregate does depend on the way the underlying distribution evolves every
time period. Fortunately, despite the distributional issues, modelling aggregate savings rate turns out
to be relatively easy.
Households, as in section 2, live for three periods but are now faced with the probability that they
will not survive beyond their second period in life, i.e. they live upto the end of their working lives
but may die at the beginning of retirement. The probability that this may happen is p where p 
(0,1). Introducing this into the utility function does not mean simply multiplying the felicity during
retirement with a (1 − p) term. It would be reasonable that households now take into account the
23In fact, we are not aware of any other paper that has actually modelled all of these together in a tractable framework.
21possibility that with the introduction of uncertain lifespans, that their descendants will receive an
unintentional bequest in additional to the intentional bequest. If all that the household cares about
is the total transfer made to their children, then they should choose a total intentional bequest lower

















where they expect the next generation to receive a bequest of Wt−ct if they themselves do not live for
the second period and a bequest of Wt−ct
t−st if they do live through retirement. Wt here is the endow-
ment at the beginning of period t -which would be wages and the return on bequests - bequests here
could be either only intentional, or both intentional and unintentional. We continue to assume that liq-
uidity constraints are not binding in the former case and hence wont bind in the latter case either. Also
note that uncertain longevity does not aﬀect investments in human capital.24 Solving the above static
problem subject to the regular budget constraints, now yields modiﬁed optimal values for consumption,
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[γ+β (1 − p)]
[γ+β (1 − p)+α]
¶
Wt (42)
The introduction of life expectancy does not aﬀect the allocation between bequests and life cycle
savings- presumably because of logarithmic utility. It does, of course, aﬀect the allocation between
(a) current consumption and (b) both future consumption and transfers by raising the weight on the
former.
As stated before the problem is that now there are groups of individuals who have diﬀerent Wt
given their dynasty’s mortality record. Consider one of these subgroups i. Within this subgroup,
all individuals receive the same bequest, or bi
t−1. They all face the same probability of death and
have the same budget constraint. And importantly they all make the same decision regarding how
much to invest in human capital, how much to set aside for a ﬁnancial transfer and how much for life
cycle savings. Lets assume that they all decide on intentional bequests of an amount bi
t and life cycle
savings, si
t. What happens next is that a fraction p of them will die at the beginning of the third






while another fraction receives bequests equal to rt+1bi
t. This means that in the next generation a






and another fraction (1 − p) based on rt+1bi
t.
Since this process repeats itself every time period, one might guess that the two variables (bi
t and si
t)
24For developed economies, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
22might follow a well deﬁned method of evolution in the aggregate. However to be able to do that, as a
starting point, we need to make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 At time t =0all individuals are alike and have the same endowment W0.
The above assumption allows for the economy in time period zero to be characterized by a rep-
resentative agent. Further, both b0 (bequests allocated at t =0 )a n ds0 (life cycle savings allocated
at t = 0) will be the same for all individuals. For the rest of the paper, IBt is the aggregate inten-
tional bequests and LSt is aggregate life cycle savings. Since population has been normalized to one,
“aggregate” here is equivalent to the weighted average of the bequest ratios of all groups in society
at any given time period, t (it is easy to ﬁgure out that the number of subgroups in any period is 2t
under assumption (1)). In Appendix C it is shown that, indeed one can ﬁgure out well deﬁned paths
for both IBt and LSt and the results are derived more thoroughly. It turns out that bequests and life
cycle savings is now characterized by a system of two diﬀerence equations,
IBt = aω(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1) − et (43)
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[γ+β (1 − p)]
[γ+β (1 − p)+α]
and the disposable income of the economically active generation is,
Dt
t = wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1 (45)
Having derived these equations, they seem quite intuitive- every period a fraction, p, of life cycle
savings in the economy ends up becoming unintentional bequests. It does not matter what the wealth
distribution of the economy is- within every existing “type” the same fraction will die early and
therefore the aggregate unintentional bequest is just a fraction of the sum of aggregate life cycle
























As before, along the balanced growth path we continue to have (IBt + LSt)g r o w i n ga tt h er a t e
(1 + g)
1
1−θ − 1. Personal disposable income for the entire economy does not change- it gets only
23reallocated. From equation (45),the personal disposable income of the adult generation is wtAtht +
rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1 and the personal disposable income of the retired is (1 − p)rtLSt−1. Therefore




(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + rtLSt−1)
(47)
The savings rate for the economically active population is,
(IBt + LSt)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1)
=( aw + as) −
et
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1)
Substituting equation (46) and rearranging gives us
(IBt + LSt)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1)
=
λ(aw + as)
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
⇒
(IBt + LSt)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1)
=
λ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
(γ+β (1 − p)+α)
Combining this with equations (43) and (44) suggests that the allocation between life cycle savings





β (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(β + γ)λ
(48)




(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + prtLSt−1)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + rtLSt−1)
⇒ Xt =
λ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
(γ+β (1 − p)+α)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + rtpLSt−1)
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + rtLSt−1)
(49)
Now note that share of the retired generation’s total disposable income
rt(1 − p)LSt−1
(wtAtht + rtIBt−1 + rtLSt−1)
=
λkλ−1
t (1 − p)LSt−1
((1 − α)kλ
t Atht + λkλ−1
t (IBt−1 + LSt−1))
which simpliﬁes to
rt(1 − p)LSt−1




Using this result and equation (48) in the equation for Xt (49) gives us,
24Xt =
λ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
(γ+β (1 − p)+α)
µ
1 −




Note that again we have a negative eﬀect of returns to education on aggregate savings. The
equation above corresponds to equation (33) above. If p =0 , it would collapse to that result with no
uncertainty. Life expectancy here clearly has two conﬂicting eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is what might be
called the utility based eﬀect which is also the standard eﬀect-higher life expectancy (1 − p) tends to
raise the savings rate since it automatically places more weight on future consumption.25 However now
there is also a negative eﬀect which is reﬂected in the term in the parentheses. Higher life expectancy
also causes the savings rate to go down here. This is because the retired generation does not save
anything but the fact that they live longer means that they account for a higher share of personal
disposable income which causes the aggregate savings rate to decline. What about the growth rate










The interest rate is a little more complicated since now individuals do not put away as much in










(γ+β (1 − p))
The two opposing factors that tend to raise and lower the savings rate, have opposite implications




γλ− β (1 − λ)θ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
(γ+β (1 − p)+α)
µ
1 −
(1 − p)β (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β)
¶
and the education expenditure share (using equations (46) and (50)) is,
Et =
(1 − λ)θ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
(γ+β (1 − p)+α)
µ
1 −
(1 − p)β (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β)
¶
We are now in a position to repeat the numerical illustrations from the earlier section. For p
we assume a value of 0.17. This is based on the 2002 US Life Tables (Arias (2004) ) ﬁgures for the
probability of surviving till the age of 65 which is 83%. Figure 6 presents the four graphs. Since life
expectancy is so high in any case, there is very little diﬀerence compared to the earlier results. One
feature that can be noticed easilly now is that the education spending ratio does not seem to decline
atleast until θ =0 .7. The interest rates are usually higher; for θ =0 .25 earlier it was 5.5% and now
25This can be easilly seen by noting that an increase in (1 − p)c a u s e s
(γ+β(1−p))
(γ+β(1−p)+α) to increase unambiguously.





25it stands at 6%. This is obviously because of the fact that individuals choose to save less given the
uncertainty. Other than that there is little diﬀerence. Repeating the earlier exercise for θ increasing
from 0.25 to 0.3, now the aggregate savings rate falls from 18.4 to 16.8 % and is accompanied by an
increase in aggregate education spending ratio from 9.2 to 10.1%. The trade-oﬀ is now slightly lower
at 1.7. This is mainly because of the fact that the retired generation’s share of disposable income is
lower.
<Insert Figure 6 Here>
The incorporation of life expectancy into the model allows us to compare the eﬀects of rising re-
turns to education and changing life expectancy in a uniﬁed framework. The consequences of rising
life expectancy on savings rates has been the subject of a long line of research and has obvious impli-
cations for domestic capital accumulation. As aging increases, a few oﬀsetting eﬀects may occur. For
example, life cycles savings will rise while accidental bequests decline. Capital accumulation could go
in either direction. The short run eﬀect would be higher life cycle savings which would imply greater
accumulation. However the higher life cycle savings are completely consumed in the next period. At
the same time accidental bequests are lower. Accidental bequests however do not translate completely
into retirement consumption. They are allocated to life cycle savings and intentional bequests. There-
fore the reduction in accidental bequests implies that the medium run capital accumulation rate will
be lower. Finally, as discussed above additional unintentional bequests make it easier to achieve the
optimal amount of human capital investment in the next period without the model potentially going
into “negative bequest” range. Given these potentially interesting possibilities, we also explored the
consequences of rising life expectancy on aggregate savings rates. Figure 7 presents some illustrations.
We have assumed three possible values for θ =0 .20,0.22 and 0.25. We have plotted life expectancy
probabilities from a 50% chance of survival to a 100% chance of survival. As before we have the four
diﬀerent economic variables. The main inference that one can draw from these ﬁg u r e si st h es m a l l
variation in the variables despite huge variations in life expectancy irrespective of the value of theta.27
The US is currently at around 1 − p =0 .83. If 1 − p were to rise to say 0.90 then the savings rate
would increase very insigniﬁcantly and for θ =0 .25 would possibly begin a slight decline. However
these diﬀerences are very small. Even if all uncertainty was wiped out the savings rate in the US
would not change by more than 0.25%. On the other hand small changes in θ can clearly have much
larger eﬀects. Thus more than ageing it is the rising returns to education that can have more dramatic
eﬀects on savings rates.28
<Insert Figure 7 Here>
27T h er e l a t i v ei n s e n s i t i v i t yo ft h e s ev a r i a b l e sa r ea l s ot r u ew h e no n ea s s u m e sm o r ee x t r e m ev a l u e sf o rθ. We found
similar movements when θ =0 .1a n dθ =0 .4.
28One disadvantage of the model is that it does not incorporate the possibility that longer life expectancy can itself
encourage human capital investment. However, this would initially encourage more “spending” on education and reduce
the savings rate but later on in life it would allow for greater savings but not necesarilly a greater savings rate.
265C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this paper was to motivate the idea that, in a world where skills are becoming
predominantly more important, one needs to think about how the composition of capital accumulation
shifts. Given that it is generally agreed many developed countries in the world have been undergoing
a period of rapid skill-biased technological progress, it is deﬁnitely worthwhile to think about the
relative importance of human capital accumulation vis-a-vis physical capital accumulation. The fact
that the savings ratio as measured by national accounts has been declining during the same period,
makes the question all the more interesting. Based on our presentation of some stylized facts that have
been ignored in the literature, a straightforward model highlighting the substitution between savings
rate and education spending and some numerical illustrations we have tried to convince the reader
of the importance of this issue. An interesting outcome of our model is the result that 1% reduction
in the aggregate savings rate require less than (and sometimes a lot less than) a 1% increase in the
education spending ratio. At the same time it is important to make a realistic assessment of the overall
contribution that this could have had in explaining the savings decline. If we use the household savings
rate, a 2% decline in savings rate because of rising returns means that we can approximately explain
20-25% of the overall decline. If we instead focus on the private savings rate we can potentially explain
a 30-40% decline. While not overpowering, we hope the reader will agree that these are important
numbers.
Regarding the model itself, there are other interesting lines along which it could be extended. For
example, we have not included public education which forms a major chunk of educational expenditures
in the U.S. An increase in public education expenditures implies that the incentive to reallocate
towards private educational expenditures is less. However, as a matter of empirical observation the
role of educational expenditures in public spending relative to private spending has fallen over the past
two decades. Indeed it is possible that it in addition to rising returns, a lowering of public support
forces individuals to increase private spending. If education can be viewed a product for which the
demand is relatively inelastic, this could be an important explanation. However this would only imply
a further reduction in the savings rate. We feel this is an important line for future research. Also,
we have not considered the heterogeneity of agents. This can aﬀect the results to the degree that
borrowing constraints are an important consideration in education ﬁnancing. However these could
be incorporated and the results are unlikely to change substantially. The fact that enrollments have
risen in college substantially indicates that there is a desire to acquire skills and increase spending on
education. Secondly, as an empirical matter people have save far less for college than they typically
have to borrow.29 Therefore it is unlikely that liquidity constraints per se present a signiﬁcant challenge
29We are grateful to Caroline Hoxby for drawing our attention to this fact and related data. A lot of interesting evidence
on the drastic increase in borrowing for higher education can be found in the web site for the National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study ( http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/getpubcats.asp?sid=013 ). For example, The percentage of dependent
undergraduates with family incomes of $50,000 or more who ever borrowed from federal loan programs increased between
1992-93 and 1995-96 at both public and private, not-for-proﬁt 4-year institutions. Further, in 1992-93, 21 percent of
27to the theory (which also explains why we have been liberal with ranges in our parameter values where
education spending implies negative transfers). However this is again in interesting area for further
research.
Finally, the paper draws attention to the measurement problem of human capital investment. As
mentioned earlier the only available measures are the direct expenditures of education expenditures
in GDP. However these are woefully inadequate. Opportunity costs of education are often considered
to be equal in magnitude of direct expenditures.30 Further in an economy like the US, a large part of
housing investment is often an investment in human capital further underscoring the mismeasurement
when relying on direct expenditures only.
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31Appendix
A Derivation of the Growth Rate and Interest Rate in the Absence
of Life Cycle Savings
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Therefore the only growth compatible with the balanced growth path is where
At−1 and b1−θ



















The next step is to calculate the interest rate which is plainly rt = αkα−1
t .















32We have already seen that At−1/b1−θ
t−1 is a ﬁx e dn u m b e r( a n dh e n c eAt+1/b1−θ
t after adjusting for










































Substituting this into equation (13) with appropriate adjustments and substituting that further
into rt = αkα−1




1−θ (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
γ
B Derivation of the Growth Rate and Interest Rate in the Presence
of Life Cycle Savings
Substituting the optimal value of education (equation (28)) in the expression for capital per eﬀective















Along the balanced growth path, (bt−1 + st−1)






























To ﬁgure out the education ratio we use equation ((28) in conjunction with (34),
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34C Deriving the Aggregate Savings Rate under Uncertainty
Under assumption (1) suppose everyone begins oﬀ with the same disposable income and for simplicity
call this b0 and s0.Of these identical agents, a fraction p will die at the beginning of period1 and a
fraction 1 − p will continue to live. Consider the bequests that the two sets of descendents receive.
Those whose parents die early will make the following choices,
s
p
1 = as(w1A1h1 + r1(b0 + s0))
b
p
1 = aω(w1A1h1 + r1(b0 + s0)) − e1
The superscript p represents the fraction whose parents did not live through retirement. From




[γ+β (1 − p)]




[γ+β (1 − p)]
[γ+β (1 − p)+α]
For those whose parents did not die:
s
1−p
1 = as(w1A1h1 + r1b0)
b
1−p
1 = aω(w1A1h1 + r1b0) − e1




1 +( 1− p)b
1−p
1
⇒ B1 = p[aω(w1A1h1 + r1(b0 + s0)) − e1]+( 1− p)[aω(w1A1h1 + r1b0) − e1]
⇒ B1 = aω(w1A1h1 + r1b0)+paωr1s0 − e1




1 +( 1− p)s
1−p
1
35⇒ S1 = p[as(w1A1h1 + r1(b0 + s0))] + (1 − p)as(w1A1h1 + r1b0)
⇒ S1 = as(w1A1h1 + r1b0 + pr1s0)
Calculating the disposable income of the economically active generation:
D1 = p(w1A1h1 + r1(b0 + s0)) + (1 − p)(w1A1h1 + r1b0)










To consider what happens in period 2:
T h e r ew i l lb en o wf o u rt y p e s :
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4. Agents with ancestral history of (p,p)
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⇒ B2 = aω(w2A2h2 + r2B1 + pr2S1) − e2
Similarly Aggregate Savings:
S2 =( 1− p)2s
1−p,1−p
2 +( 1− p)ps
1−p,p





⇒ S2 = as(w2A2h2 + r2B1 + pr2S1)
Disposable income in time period 2 will now be
D2 = w2A2h2 + r2B1 + pr2S1
One can now infer the emerging aggregate pattern. In every period, a fraction p of the earlier pe-
riod’s life cycle savings ends up as being an unintentional bequest. This obviously raises the disposable
income as well.
Therefore we have the following basic structure:
Bt = aω(wtAtht + rtBt−1 + prtSt−1) − et
St = as(wtAtht + rtBt−1 + prtSt−1)
Dt
t = wtAtht + rtBt−1 + prtSt−1
37D Deriving the Interest Rate under Uncertainty
Beginning with the aggregate savings rate given by equation (50)
Xt =
λ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
(γ+β (1 − p)+α)
µ
1 −





(wtAtht + rtBt−1 + rtSt−1)
=
λ
(λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β (1 − p))
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µ
1 −
(1 − p)β (λ +( 1− λ)θ)
(γ+β)
¶
⇒ (Bt + St)=
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Figure 4: Private Education Spending and Household Savings Rates Across OECD Countries (2000)
40Figure 5: Numerical Illustration with Life Cycle Savings
α =0 .6,β=0 .25,γ=0 .15,g=0 .02





























































































































































41Figure 6: Numerical Illustrations with Life Cycle Savings and Unintentional Bequests
α =0 .6,β=0 .25,γ=0 .15,g=0 .02,p=0 .17

































































































































































42Figure 7: Changes in Life Expectancy
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